INTRODUCTION
Nonatomic strategic (or noncooperative) games ( [ 20] ) model interactions involving a large number of individuals, each with a negligible ability to affect the others. Only coalitions, comprising many individuals, can significantly affect the utility of those outside them. Congestion games ( [ 14] , [ 17] ) are strategic games in which the contribution to a player's utility from choosing a particular action or facility varies with the number of other players making the same choice. Such games aim at modeling the congestion externalities occurring in many real-life situations in which several, or many, independent decision-makers interact by using the same facilities. In the nonatomic congestion games studied in this paper, each player only chooses one action or facility, and his utility strictly decreases as the size of the set of other players choosing the same action or facility increases. Different players do not necessarily achieve the same utility when making the same choice. In this respect, the population of players is heterogeneous. However, the manner in which utility decreases with increased congestion is the same for all. The following example (adapted from [ 4] ) illustrates these assumptions. People in a professional meeting may prefer to go to different sessions, since the intrinsic quality they assign to each session varies. As more people crowd into a room, it becomes more difficult to see and hear. The actual quality each person assigns to a session therefore depends on both the intrinsic quality and the number of other people present. The delays experienced by clients in a computer network when many of them simultaneously try to access the same server are another example.
In nonatomic congestion games of the kind considered here, the equilibrium payoffs are always unique. Moreover, the equilibria are Pareto efficient in the sense that it is not possible to modify an equilibrium in such a way that some players become better off without making some of the others worse off. However, the equilibria need not be socially optimal. That is, they may all be inferior to some non-equilibrium assignment of facilities in terms of the aggregate, or equivalently average, utility or cost. (Note that, unlike Pareto efficiency, the notion of social optimality involves interpersonal comparisons of utilities.) For the equilibria to maximize social welfare, a player's utility from choosing a facility should reflect the external effects of his choice on the other players. In other words, the cost or benefit for the individual must mirror the social cost or benefit. The first main result of this paper is that, under the assumption 3 that the marginal social costs of congestion are increasing and there are at least three facilities, a necessary and sufficient condition for always reaching maximum aggregate utility at the equilibria of the game is that the players' utility from choosing a particular facility decreases logarithmically as the size of the set of other players choosing the same facility increases. For non-logarithmic cost functions, there are always fixed utilities or costs for which none of the equilibria is socially optimal. If there are only two facilities, the class of cost functions for which equilibria are always socially optimal is somewhat larger.
An alternative way of demonstrating the connection between social optimality of the equilibria and a logarithmic relation between congestion and utility is the so-called potential approach. For a given nonatomic congestion game, there is always some function attaining its maximum at the equilibria of the game. Indeed, there are always cost functions such that the aggregate utility with respect to them is maximized at the equilibria of the original game. If, up to an additive constant, these cost functions are equal to the original ones, then, clearly, all the equilibria in the original game are socially optimal. For logarithmic congestion externalities, this is, indeed, the case.
The result that social optimality of the equilibria is guaranteed if and only if the cost functions are logarithmic may very well be interpreted as a negative one. Unless the congestion externalities have this special form, maximum aggregate utility or minimum aggregate cost cannot generally be achieved without some form of external intervention or, alternatively, cooperation among the players. This raises the question of how this utility or cost should be shared among them. This may be viewed either in a normative light, as a question of each player's "appropriate" or "just" share, or in a positive light, as a question of the likely outcome of negotiations among the players.
The utility or cost-sharing rule proposed in this paper is derived from a very general solution concept, the Harsanyi transferable-utility value of a strategic game ( [ 2] , [ 9] , [ 21] ). This solution concept is based on the players' marginal contributions to the bargaining power of various coalitions, each bargaining with its complement about its share of the maximum aggregate utility. More specifically, the Harsanyi TU value is defined as the Aumann-Shapley value of the coalitional game in which the worth of each coalition and that of its complement add up to the maximum aggregate utility in the strategic game, and are determined as Nash's solution to the corresponding bargaining problem with threats. The second main result of this paper is that, if the An example in which the equilibrium is Pareto efficient but not socially optimal is shown in Fig. 2 . In this example, the population of players is heterogeneous. For three-quarters of the population (type I players), the left route from o to d is faster than the right one when both routes are equally congested. For the rest (type II players), the opposite is true. (If the two routes represent, for example, two parallel bridges over a river, the different travel times may reflect the distance each user has to travel to get to the bridge.) When all the type I players take the left route and all the type II players take the right one, their travel times are 7 and 3 minutes, respectively.
For each player, this is less than the travel time on the alternative route-which is greater than 7 minutes as long as that route is used by some other players. This shows both that the above arrangement is an equilibrium and that it is Pareto efficient.
However, it is not socially optimal. To achieve the social optimum, 1/16 of the population (all type I) should shift from the left to the right route. This reduces the average travel time from 6 minutes to 5.9375. The social optimum is not an equilibrium, since the travel time of type I players taking the right route is 3 minutes longer than of identical players taking the left route. Non-optimality of the equilibrium in the last example can be attributed to overuse of the left route (by type I players). It is possible to reduce the use of that route to the socially optimal level by charging a toll equivalent to 3 minutes of travel time for the use of the left route. This toll and the resulting increased congestion in the right route would make everyone worse off in comparison with the equilibrium. However, if toll revenues are returned to the players, for instance, in the form of a lump sum transfer to each player, then the toll's net effect is positive, at least on average. If the population of players were homogeneous (as it is in the first example), there would be little question that the transfers to players should be equal, and bring their net costs to the social optimum level. However, in the present heterogeneous case, the question of whether and to what extent the transfers to type I and type II players should differ arises.
There are a number of alternative principles that may be evoked to answer this question, each prescribing different lump sum transfers to players and different net costs. Some of the possibilities are shown in Table 1 . One option is simply equal net 7 costs to all players, regardless of type. However, this option, which involves negative transfers to type II players, may be difficult to justify in view of these players' much lower equilibrium costs. Another option is equal transfers, regardless of type. This has the opposite effect of favoring type II players to a degree that may be hard to justify. A third conceivable principle is that everybody should be equally better off compared with the equilibrium, i.e., equal distribution of the surplus arising from the shift from the (non-cooperative) equilibrium to the social optimum. A possible objection to this arrangement is that type II players, who have no active role in this shift, would benefit from it as mush as type I players. A fourth scheme for sharing the gains from shifting to the social optimum among the players, described later in this paper, is the Harsanyi transferable-utility value of the nonatomic congestion game. In the example at hand, this rule prescribes giving most of the toll revenues to the type I players and much less to type II, so that the former are better off while the latter are worse off compared to the equilibrium. This reflects the payoffs, at the social optimum, of those players still using their equilibrium strategies. Theorem 3] . As the first example makes clear, the network in Fig. 1 does not belong to this class. The nonatomic congestion games studied in this paper are such that each player's payoff is only affected by the measure of the set of players whose choice of action or facility is the same as his. This corresponds to a network with parallel routes and excludes the one in Fig. 1 . Therefore, for these games, Pareto efficiency of the equilibria is guaranteed. The only issue is their social optimality.
As a final example, consider the situation in Fig. 3 . Here, for each type of player, choosing each of the facilities brings a certain utility (that may be positive or negative), which depends on the size of the set of other players making the same choice. As the size of this set increases, the utility decreases. When it tends to zero, the utility tends to infinity. At equilibrium, 3/7 of the players, all type I, choose facility 1, and the rest choose facility 2. The payoff of type I players choosing either facility is then log 7/8, and that of type II is log 35/32. To find the social optimum, observe, first, that increasing the utility of type II players choosing facility 1 by a positive constant  can only increase the maximum average utility, or leave it without a change. Setting   log 15/8 makes the difference between the utility of type II and type I players choosing the same facility equal to the constant log 5/4. Therefore, with this , the maximum average utility is given by max 0
This maximum (which is attained at x  3/7) can easily be shown to be equal to the average utility at equilibrium in the original game.
This proves that the equilibrium in that game is socially optimal. As it turns out, this finding is not a coincidence. It is shown below that, when the cost of congestion is
given by a logarithmic function, the equilibria are always socially optimal.
9 log 2  log 8x 3 If the size of the set of players using facility j is x j  0, the cost of congestion for each of them is c j (x j ). For different facilities j, the cost of congestion may take different functional forms. This reflects the fact that certain roads, for example, are more easily congested than others. The social cost of congestion is  j x j c j (x j ). Marginal social costs of congestion are said to be increasing if, for all facilities j, the derivative
exists and is strictly increasing in (0, ). A similar notation is also used for other vector-valued functions.
The utility each player i achieves is made up of two terms:
The first term f j (i) is the fixed utility player i gains from the facility j he uses. This does not depend on the other players' choices of facility, and may be positive or negative. In the latter case, it may be interpreted as a fixed cost. The second term c j (
is the cost of congestion. Note that the heterogeneity of the population is assumed to involve only the fixed utility (or cost) and not the cost of congestion (the variable cost). For a more general model, in which different players may be affected to a different degree by congestion, see [ 12] . The fixed-utility assignment f :
, is assumed to be bounded and measurable (with respect to C).
A (pure-) strategy profile is any measurable function  : I  {0, 1} m assigning each
is 1 for some facility j and 0 for all the others. A value of 1 indicates that player i uses facility j. The size of the set of players using facility j equals the integral   j (i) dµ(i), henceforth written as µ( j ). The set of all strategy profiles is denoted by . For a given strategy profile , the utility each player i achieves can be written as
where µ() is the vector (µ( 1 ), µ( 2 ), … , µ( m )) and the dot denotes scalar product.
For given cost functions c and fixed-utility assignment f, this defines a nonatomic congestion game (c, f), with utility functions u i . A strategy profile  is a (pure-11 strategy Nash) equilibrium in (c, f) if, for (-) almost all players i,
In this case, the expression on the right-hand side of (2) gives player i's equilibrium payoff. The indefinite integral 4 (with respect to ) of this expression is the equilibrium payoff distribution.
A strategy profile  is Pareto efficient if, for every strategy profile  such that u i ()  u i () for almost all players i, an equality holds for almost all i. A strategy profile  will be said to be hyper-efficient if it satisfies the following stronger condition:
In other words, a strategy profile is hyper-efficient if any effective change of strategies is harmful to some of those whose strategies change. 5 The assumed continuity of the cost functions implies that such a strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Indeed, it is a strong, and even strictly strong, equilibrium. 6 This means that deviations are unprofitable, not just for individuals but also for groups of players, or coalitions: Any deviation that makes some members of the coalition better off must leave some of the others worse off. From a social-welfare point of view, a strategy profile  is socially optimal, or welfare maximizing, in (c, f) if it maximizes the aggregate utility, i.e., for all   ,
Social optimality implies Pareto efficiency. However, it does not imply hyperefficiency, or vice versa. 4 The indefinite integral of an integrable function g : I  ℝ is the measure defined by (S)= ∫ S g dµ (S  C).
5 Note that, in contrast to Pareto efficiency, the definition of hyper-efficiency involves both the players' utilities and their strategies. The term "hyper-efficiency," generalized in a straightforward manner, is also applicable to other situations in which utilities are determined by some map on the space of players, such as a strategy profile or an allocation of goods.
EXISTENCE AND SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIA
The existence of equilibrium in all nonatomic congestion games in the class considered in this paper is an immediate corollary of [ 12, Theorem 3.1].
Proposition 1.
For every c and f, the nonatomic congestion game (c, f) has at least one equilibrium.
It can be shown (cf. [ 12] ) that, in some precise sense, the equilibrium is generically unique. However, for present purposes, it suffices to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. The proof of the following proposition is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 2.
For every c and f, a strategy profile is an equilibrium in (c, f) if and only if it is hyper-efficient (i.e., has the property H). For each facility j, the measure of the set of players using j is the same in all the equilibria in (c, f). Consequently, the equilibrium payoffs are unique.
By Proposition 2, in all nonatomic congestion games, all equilibria are hyper-, and hence Pareto, efficient. (As already mentioned, this result is, in fact, true in a much larger class of nonatomic congestion games than the one considered here. See [ 13,
Theorem 3].) 7 The equilibria need not, however, be socially optimal. This is because players choosing their facilities do not take into consideration the negative external effects of their choice on the other players. As is well known, to guarantee social optimality, players should bear, not the cost c j of using facility j, but rather the marginal social cost MC j . The following proposition establishes and extends this fact.
The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.
Suppose that the marginal social costs of congestion are increasing.
Then, for every fixed-utility assignment f, the nonatomic congestion game (c, f) has at least one socially optimal strategy profile. Moreover, the set of all socially optimal strategy profiles coincides with the set of equilibria in (MC, f). Either it also coincides with the set of equilibria in the original game (c, f), or the two sets are disjoint.
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It is not difficult to see that, for an arbitrary socially optimal strategy profile , it is possible to replace the marginal social cost functions MC in Proposition 3 by any
holds, then , which by Proposition 3 is an equilibrium in (MC, f), is also an equilibrium in (c, f), and it therefore follows from Proposition 2 that the sets of equilibria in these two games coincide.) One cost function satisfying this is given by Then, for every fixed-utility assignment f, there is a nonnegative vector w  ℝ  m such that a strategy profile is socially optimal in (c, f) if and only if it is an equilibrium in
The vector w may be interpreted as follows: Its jth component w j is a (Pigouvian)
toll charged for the use of facility j. 8 Proposition 4 thus asserts that, with increasing marginal social costs of congestion, there is always a toll system guaranteeing socially optimal use of the facilities. 9 Clearly, for every   0, subtracting  from all the components of w does not change any of the players' behavior. Therefore, it is always possible to maximize social welfare and run a balanced budget by implementing a system of tolls and subsidies which, at equilibrium, cancel out one another. It also follows from these considerations that if for some (and, hence, every) socially optimal strategy profile  the product ( j ) dc j /dx(( j )) has the same value for all j, then no tolls or subsidies are required since all the equilibria are automatically socially optimal. If the cost functions (up to arbitrary additive constants) are logarithmic with a common base a  1, then this condition clearly holds, and hence social optimality of the equilibria is guaranteed for every fixed-utility assignment f. The following 8 The idea of imposing tolls in order to increase social welfare was first proposed by Pigou. See also Knight's [ 10] discussion of it, and the much more detailed analysis in [ 5] .
theorem shows that, if there are three or more facilities, then this is, in fact, the only case in which the equilibria are guaranteed to be socially optimal. Note that the proof of the theorem, which is given in Appendix B, does not rely on the potential heterogeneity of the population. Therefore, the theorem would also be true if, in the definition of nonatomic congestion game, players were assumed to be identical (i.e., only constant fixed-utility assignments were allowed).
Theorem 1.
If m 3, then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) For every fixed-utility assignment f, the set of all socially optimal strategy profiles in (c, f) coincides with the set of equilibria in this game.
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(ii) For every strictly positive probability vector (x 1 , x 2 , … , x m ) (with x j  0 for all j and
If m  2, then (i) and (ii) are still equivalent, and are implied by (iii), but the reverse implication need not hold.
As the last part of Theorem 1 asserts, if there are only two facilities, there exist certain non-logarithmic cost functions (which are, however, similar in some respect to the logarithmic functions; see the proof of Theorem 1) that satisfy the condition of increasing marginal social costs of congestion, for which equilibria are always socially optimal. For such cost functions, condition (ii) in the theorem holds. The following cost functions are an example of this:
Even with more than two facilities, there are certain non-logarithmic cost functions c for which social optimality of the equilibria in (c, f) holds for some fixed-utility assignments f. For example, if all the players are identical, with f  0, then this is the case when the cost functions are homogeneous of the same degree, i.e., for some [ 4] ). This is because, for such cost functions, the marginal social costs are proportional to the respective costs, and therefore the sets of equilibria in (c, 0) and (MC, 0) coincide. However, with more than two facilities, non-logarithmic cost functions cannot guarantee social optimality of the equilibria for all fixed-utility assignments.
THE POTENTIAL By Proposition 3, if the marginal social costs of congestion are increasing, then, for every fixed-utility assignment f, the set of all socially optimal strategy profiles in 
Aggregate utility in (ĉ, f) is given by the function P :   ℝ defined by
Therefore, as a corollary of Proposition 3, we get the following result.
Proposition 5.
Suppose that, for all facilities j, the integral
for every fixed-utility assignment f, a strategy profile  is an equilibrium in (c, f) if and only if it maximizes P, i.e.,
In the transportation literature, the fact that the equilibrium assignment problem can be formulated as a maximization problem is well known (see, e.g., [ 22, p. 59] ). The original formulation, in the case of a homogeneous population of players, is due to the consumers' surplus. This is because c j is the average, rather than marginal, social cost. P can be interpreted as a potential for (c, f). Recall that, in a finite-player congestion game ( [ 7] , [ 14] , [ 17] ), the potential is defined as any real-valued function over the set of strategy profiles with the property that, for all strategy profiles and all single-player deviations from them, the gain or loss for the deviator equals the corresponding change in the potential. Any strategy profile maximizing the potential is clearly an equilibrium, and for certain finite-player congestion games with concave potentials ( [ 16] ), as well as certain symmetric ones ( [ 23] ), the converse is also known to be true. In the present infinite-player model, the potential P has similar properties.
Intuitively, when a single player switches from one facility to another, the change in that player's utility has the same sign as the corresponding infinitesimal change in P.
This provides an intuition for the "if" part of Proposition 5. The "only if" part can be demonstrated by a simple concavity argument. Proposition 5 can be used for giving an alternative proof for the existence of an equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs in (c, f). Indeed, the potential approach can also be used to establish these properties in more general models, in which each player chooses a combinations of facilities, rather than a single one (e.g., a number of road segments, constituting a particular route from his point of origin to the destination). See, e.g., [ 1] . easily be shown to be equivalent to (iii) in that theorem.
COOPERATION
It follows from Theorem 1 (and the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs) that, in many nonatomic congestion games of the type considered here, none of the equilibria is socially optimal. To maximize social welfare in such games, outside intervention, or alternatively cooperation among the players, is required. This may, for example, take the concrete form of a toll system, since, by Proposition 4, social optimality can always be achieved by charging suitable tolls for the use of certain facilities.
However, regardless of the way it is achieved, social optimality generally requires that some players choose their facilities in an individually non-optimal way, relative to the original fixed utilities and cost functions. Arguably, these players should be compensated, e.g., by transferring to them some toll revenues. Thus, achieving maximum aggregate utility or minimum aggregate cost involves both a mechanism and a predetermined rule for sharing this utility or cost among the players.
If all players are identical, and their fates vary only because social good dictates that some of them make different choices than others, then arguably the maximum aggregate utility should be shared equally among them. However, in a heterogeneous population, in which players' innate preferences differ, there is much less basis for arguing that everybody should be treated equally. For, even in the absence of externalities, players would differ in the choices they make and the utility they achieve. One alternative to equal distribution of the aggregate utility is equal distribution of the surplus. According to this alternative, all players' shares of the maximum aggregate utility should be higher than their equilibrium payoffs by the same amount. However, there are arguments against this idea, too. For example, if the players' contributions to achieving the social optimum differ, then it is not clear why their gains from it should be equal. Suppose, for example, that the population of players is made up of several sub-populations, favoring and using disjoint sets of facilities. It seems reasonable to argue that, since different sub-populations do not interact in any way with one another, the gains from cooperation within each sub-population should be shared among its members only, and not with the other sub-populations.
As already mentioned, one concrete tool for achieving social optimality in a nonatomic congestion game is a suitable system of tolls, which make players internalize the social effects of their choices. This suggests a third way of sharing the maximum aggregate utility achievable in such games, namely, equal distribution of toll revenues. This can be done either by making equal lump-sum transfers to all players or by lowering tolls uniformly for all facilities, so that some of them became negative (i.e., subsidies). Again, this raises the question of why players who are not affected in any way by the tolls should get the same share of the toll revenues as those who are affected.
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The three schemes mentioned above for sharing the aggregate utility or cost of the social optimum among the players are illustrated by the example in Table 1. This table   also gives the solution prescribed by a fourth sharing rule, which will now be described. The idea behind this utility or cost-sharing rule is that the players' shares 
between these payoffs is
According to Nash, with threat strategies  S and  nonatomic coalitional games, the space pNA, and related terms, see [ 3] .
Definition. The cost functions satisfy the convexity condition if, for all j and all y  0, the partial derivative
exists and is strictly increasing as a function of x in (0, ).
It can be shown that, if the cost functions satisfy the convexity condition, then each Clearly, the convexity condition is stronger than increasing marginal social costs of congestion. The additional requirement it represents is explicitly spelt out in the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix B. By contrast, for c j (x)  x 4 , the convexity condition does not hold: this cost function is "too" convex. This is consequential. As shown in Appendix A, with this cost function, 21 the worth of coalitions may not be well defined. This shows the importance of assuming the convexity condition in the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.
Suppose that the cost functions satisfy the convexity condition. Then, for every fixed-utility assignment f, the coalitional form v of (c, f) is well defined and is in pNA, and the Harsanyi TU value of (c, f) is given by the formula
where, for every 0  t  1, the inner integral is uniquely determined by the following condition: There exists a pair of strategy profiles  and  such that
and, for almost all players i,
and
To understand the last part of the theorem, note that, by (8) , for every 0  t  1, the corresponding strategy profile  is an equilibrium, and the inner integral in (7) gives the equilibrium payoff distribution, in the nonatomic congestion game (c t , f) with cost functions c j t (x) def  MC j *(tx, ( j 1t )). In particular, for t  1/2,  is an equilibrium, and the inner integral gives the equilibrium payoff distribution, in the original game (c, f). This follows from the fact that setting t  1/2 and    reduces both equations in (8) to (2). For t  1,  is an equilibrium, and the inner integral in (7) gives the equilibrium payoff distribution, in (MC, f). By Proposition 3, this strategy profile  is socially optimal in the original game (c, f).
In some cases, the inner integral in (7) can also be given a similar interpretation for other values of t. Specifically, consider the case of linear cost functions of the form c j (x)  c j (1) x. In this case, direct computation gives c j t (x)  2t c j (x). Therefore, Eq. (7) implies that the Harsanyi TU value of (c, f) equals the integral mean of the equilibrium payoff distributions in all games of the form (2t c, f), with t varying between 0 and 1. At one end of this interval, the costs of congestion tend to zero, while at the other, they tend to the respective marginal social costs.
Example. Consider again the nonatomic congestion game (c, f) described in Fig. 2 .
At the unique equilibrium in this game, all the type I and type II players take the left and right routes, respectively. This separating equilibrium is common, in fact, to all games of the form (2t c, f), with 0  t  3/4. However, for 3/4  t  1, the equilibria in (2t c, f) involve some type I players joining the type II players in taking the right route, thereby decreasing the cost for the remaining type I players and increasing it for the type II players. It therefore follows from (7) that the value of (c, f) to type I players is greater than their equilibrium payoff and the value to type II players is less than their equilibrium payoff. Exact computation shows, in fact, that, compared to the equilibrium, type I and type II players are better off and worse off, respectively, by the equivalent of exactly 1/8 minute of travel time.
In the last example, some players' equilibrium, or noncooperative, payoffs, which are obtained when all the players seek to maximize their own utility or minimize their own cost, disregarding those of the others, are greater than their cooperative payoffs, which are given by the formula (7). For other players, the converse is true. This may also occur in nonatomic congestion games with socially optimal equilibria, and in this case, the Harsanyi TU value of the game is different not only from the equilibrium payoff distribution but also from the payoff distribution induced by any strategy profile; in other words, a value strategy profile does not exist. (Indeed, by Proposition 3, a strategy profile that is not an equilibrium is not even socially optimal.) A very different case, in which the equilibrium payoff distribution and the value always coincide, is that of logarithmic cost functions. The proof of the following proposition is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 7.
Suppose that the cost functions are as in (iii) in Theorem 1. Then, for every fixed-utility assignment f, the equilibrium payoff distribution in (c, f) coincides with the Harsanyi TU value of the game.
It follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 7 that, with three or more facilities, the logarithmic cost functions are the only ones satisfying the convexity condition for which the coincidence of the Harsanyi TU value and the equilibrium payoff distribution is guaranteed. Proposition 7 is illustrated by the following example.
Example. Consider again the nonatomic congestion game (c, f) described in Fig. 3 . of the Aumann-Shapley value, see [ 3] .) Because of this, coalitions of the kind mentioned before, in which the ratio between the two types is highly biased, are 13 Note that the former function is linear. This is so by definition. The latter function is obviously nonlinear, which implies that the core of v is empty. For further discussion of this nonlinearity, see below.
14 Another aspect of the difference in bargaining power between the two coalitions is the fact that the marginal contribution of type I players to the worth of either coalition is greater than that of type II players. In fact, the marginal contribution of the former is positive while that of the latter is negative.
This difference stems from the different abilities of these two types of players to help the coalition they join while simultaneously causing maximum harm to the rival coalition. For coalitions lying closer to the diagonal (see below), the marginal contributions have the reverse signs: negative for type I players and positive for type II. The reason, as explained below, is that the marginal contributions to the worth of such coalitions are equal to the players' equilibrium payoffs.
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irrelevant to the computation of the value. In fact, the value is completely determined by any open set of coalitions that contains the relative interior of diagonal (that is, the diagonal without its endpoints). As seen in Fig. 4 , there are some (indeed, many) such sets in which, for all coalitions, the worth and the aggregate equilibrium payoff are equal. The existence of such sets, which in some sense (that will not be explained here) is a generic property of nonatomic congestion games with logarithmic cost functions, implies that, close to the diagonal, the marginal contributions of players to the worth of coalitions are equal to their equilibrium payoffs. Therefore, the Harsanyi TU value, which reflects the players' marginal contributions to the worth of coalitions lying along the diagonal, equals the equilibrium payoff distribution. This may help understand why, in games with logarithmic cost functions, the players' noncooperative (i.e., equilibrium) and cooperative (i.e., value) payoffs coincide. The present paper represents an attempt to make comparisons similar to those for market economies in the context of strategic games. While questions similar to those considered here can be raised for any strategic game with, or even without, transferable utility, this study is only concerned with one specific class of nonatomic congestion games. As it shows, even in this restricted context it is not possible to obtain results as general as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics or the value equivalence theorem. In fact, equilibria may or may not be socially optimal, and, even when they are, the players' equilibrium, or noncooperative payoffs need not coincide with their cooperative ones.
There are two exceptions to these findings. The most striking are logarithmic cost functions. For these, not only are the equilibria always socially optimal, but also the equilibrium payoff distribution coincides with the value. The other special case is that of linear cost functions. For these, another connection between the value and certain equilibrium payoffs holds. Namely, the value can be computed by first finding the equilibrium payoff distribution in all games differing from the original one only in 26 that the slopes of the cost functions are multiplied by a positive constant, which is less than two, and then taking the average of these payoffs.
The fact that in nonatomic congestion games equilibria may fail to be socially optimal raises the question of how far these equilibria can be from the social optimum. A recent paper addressing this question in a model related to, but not identical with, the present one is [ 19] . For example, for a homogeneous population of users and linear, nonnegative costs (such as those in Fig. 1 ), the average cost in equilibrium is shown in [ 19] not to exceed 4/3 of that at the social optimum. For cost functions that are given by higher-degree polynomials, the corresponding upper bound is higher. (5) gives
A necessary condition for ( S ,  I \ S ) to be a saddle point of H S is that the members of S cannot increase H S by moving from facility 1 to facility 2, i.e., by decreasing x.
A necessary condition for this is that the partial derivative of the expression on the right-hand side of (9) with respect to x is nonnegative:
A second necessary condition for ( S ,  I \ S ) to be a saddle point of H S is that members of I \ S cannot decrease H S by moving between facilities. If all the members of I \ S use the same facility, then this condition is not satisfied, for it is easy to see that, in such a case, moving a few members of I \ S to the other facility would increase this coalition's aggregate utility more than it would increase the aggregate utility of S (if at all). Therefore, a necessary condition for a saddle point is that members of I \ S use both facilities, i.e., 0  y  0.9. This implies that, for ( S ,  I \ S ) to be a saddle point, the partial derivative of the expression on the right-hand side of (9) with respect to y must vanish:
Subtracting (11) from (10) gives
Adding these equations gives (
0.1, then the right-hand side of the last inequality is equal to (1  x  y) 4 , and therefore 4 , which contradicts the assumption that x  0. Therefore, it must be that 0  x  0.1, i.e., members of S use both facilities. This implies that a necessary condition for ( S ,  I \ S ) to be a saddle point is that (10), as well as all the weak inequalities that follow from it, hold as equalities. In particular, x  y  0.5 and 
Thus, the third cost function is type-specific. For the coalition S consisting of half the type I players and half the type II players, and for a given strategy  S of S and a given strategy  I \ S of I \ S, consider the difference between the aggregate utilities of S and I \ S. This is given by a function H S which is a straightforward generalization of (5) to type-specific cost functions. It is not difficult to see that, because S and its complement are identical in composition, a necessary condition for H S to have some saddle point is that is has a symmetric one, in which the facility choice of each type of player is the same in S and I \ S. The symmetry of the saddle point implies that, if a small group of players in S switches from one facility to another, the first-order change in H S equals the change in these players' aggregate utility. By definition, at a saddle point the change in H S cannot be positive. Therefore, a symmetric saddle point must correspond to an equilibrium in the nonatomic congestion game. When half of the type I players use facility 1, half the type II players use facility 2, and the rest of the players use facility 3, the game is at equilibrium. In fact, this is the only kind of equilibrium in the game. It follows that, in every symmetric saddle point of H S , the players in both S and I \ S choose their facilities in the manner just indicated.
However, suppose that, at such a point, a small group of type II members of S using facility 2 switch to facility 3, and at the same time a group of type I members of S who use facility 3 switch to facility 1. Brief computation shows that, if these groups have measures  and 2, respectively, then H S increases by  2 . (Incidentally, this shows that, at the point under consideration, H S is not concave in its first argument.)
The fact that the change in H S is positive contradicts the assumption that the original point was a saddle point. This contradiction proves that H S does not have a saddle point.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
This appendix contains the proofs of the two theorems in this paper, as well as those of Propositions 2, 3, 6, and 7. First, several new definitions, and two lemmas, are
given.
An ideal coalition is a measurable function h : I  [0, 1]. The set of all ideal coalitions is denoted by I. In the following, I is seen as a subset of the Banach space L  (µ) endowed with the relative weak* topology. 15 Thus, ideal coalitions that are equal almost everywhere are identified. By Alaoglu's theorem, the space I is compact.
This is a generalization of (the two-person game) H S defined in (5) . Note that
It is easy to see that if the pair ( h ,  1h ) is also a saddle point, then both inequalities in (12) are, in fact, equalities. 
It follows from [ 6, Theorem 4] that, for every ( h ,  1h )   h   1h , there is some
then, by the convexity condition and the remark that follows Eq. (12), 
is the constant function 1.) Since the set S is easily seen to be closed, and hence compact, the range of the continuous function
) is also compact. The range of  j coincides with the graph of  j . Therefore, the latter function has a compact graph, and hence is continuous.  Lemma 2. Suppose that the cost functions satisfy the convexity condition. For every
is a saddle point if and only if it satisfies the following equations:
In this case, MC j *(µ( j h ), µ( j 1h )) is finite (i.e.,  ) for all j.
The intuitive content of (13) is that the facility choice of each "member" of the ideal coalition h maximizes his contribution to the difference between the aggregate utilities of the complementary ideal coalitions h and 1 -h. If the player chooses facility j, his contribution is equal to his fixed utility from using j minus the effect of his choice on the difference between the aggregate costs of using the facility to the members of h and 1  h. The intuitive content of (14) is similar.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix h  I, and (
For every g  I and every
If µ( g )  µ( h ), then, by the convexity condition, the expression in square brackets is
In the special case g  h, this gives the left inequality in (12) . (The general case is only required later.) The right inequality is similarly implied by (14) . Therefore, (13) and (14) together imply that ( h ,  1h ) is a saddle point.
Conversely, for h  I, suppose that ( h ,  1h ) is a saddle point. Suppose also that 
Moreover, inspection of the proof of (15) shows that the last inequality holds as an equality only if
) by definition of saddle point, this proves (13). The proof of (14) is similar.
For every h  I, every ( h ,  1h )   h   1h , and every j such that µ( j h )  0 or
Therefore, the left-hand sides of (13) and 
for all players i in this set. And, since
for almost all of them. Together, these equalities and inequalities give
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. It remains to show that every strategy profile  that is not an equilibrium does not satisfy H. It follows from the assumed continuity of the cost functions that, for every strategy profile  that is not an equilibrium, there is some facility j and some   0 such that the set of all players i with u i ()  f j (i)  c j (µ( j )  ) has positive measure.
Let I j be a subset of this set with 0  (I j )  , and  the strategy profile defined by 
Quick inspection of the proof of Lemma 2 shows, in fact, that the last equivalence remains true if the convexity condition is replaced by the weaker condition of increasing marginal social costs. Therefore, if the latter condition holds, is socially optimal in (c, f) if and only if it satisfies (17), i.e., it is an equilibrium in (MC, f).
This proves that the set of socially optimal strategy profiles in (c, f) coincides with the set of equilibria in (MC, f). Since, by Proposition 1, the latter set is nonempty, and, by Proposition 2, all its elements are the same in terms of the measure of the set of players using each facility, the same two properties hold for the set of all socially optimal strategy profiles in (c, f). It remains to show that if this set has at least one element in common with the set of equilibria in (c, f), then the two sets are, in fact, equal.
Suppose there is some equilibrium  in (c, f) that is socially optimal. It then follows from the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs (Proposition 2) that all the equilibria in (c, f) are socially optimal. Conversely, let  be a socially optimal strategy profile. As shown above, µ()  µ(). It therefore follows from (2) that u i ()  u i () for almost all i, and hence the inequality (3) holds. However, since  is assumed to be socially optimal, (3) must, in fact, be an equality. Therefore, the equality u i ()  u i () must hold for almost all i. This, together with (2) and the equality µ()  µ(), implies that  is an equilibrium. 
for all k  j and 0  x  1  x j . This implies that the limit lim x  0 x c' k (x) (where c' k  dc k /dx) exists, does not depend on k, and is positive. Denoting this limit by b, Eq. (18) gives c' j (x j )  b/x j , for all j and 0  x j  1. Integrating both sides of this equality, we get Therefore, c 1 (0)  c 2 (0)  . This result will help to prove the equivalence of (i) and
(ii).
To prove that (ii) implies (i), suppose that (ii) holds, and let f be a fixed-utility assignment and  a strategy profile. As shown above,
Therefore, if ( j )  0 for some j, then max j (f j (i) -MC j (µ( j )))  max j (f j (i) - Conversely, suppose that  j is concave, and its derivative is therefore nonincreasing.
As shown above, this implies (19) . For every x  0, y  0, and x  0, a little algebra gives that 
Using (15) twice, first in its original form and then with  1g ,  g , and  1h substituted for  h ,  1h , and  g , respectively, gives Proof of Proposition 7. To prove the conclusion of the proposition, it suffices to assume that condition (ii) in Theorem 1 holds (which is weaker than condition (iii)).
As shown in the proof of that theorem, this condition implies that, for every fixedutility assignment f and every equilibrium  in (c, f), ( j )  0 for all j. Hence, by condition (ii), there is a constant b such that, for all j and 0  t  1, Therefore, it follows from (2) that, for all 0  t  1, (8) holds with   ,  t  t, and  1t  (1  t) . Eqs. (7) and (23) 
